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ABSTRACT: Operating from the premise that the literature on the 
control of international terrorism is inadequate, the authors sys-
tematically develop general alternatives for mastering interna-
tional terrorism. Using a representative terrorist incident as the 
vehicle for considering the general strategies to be followed within 
the framework of ongoing international terrorism, the authors ana-
lyze the incident as a historical event. As such, the event can be set 
within a given historical context and examined comprehensively 
from the viewpoint of alternate possible beginnings, strategies to be 
followed and tactics to be effected within the framework of the 
incident itself, and systematic consideration of a range of possible 
outcomes. The authors consider that adequate control of interna-
tional terrorism and the incidents that reflect its essential character 
must include strategies encompassing at least factors of politics, 
law, law enforcement, propaganda, armed military force, psychol-
ogy, and time. 
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T ERRORISM, international ter-rorism, or transnational ter-
rorism, or however else it is styled, 
has become a ubiquitous phenom-
enon of twentieth-century poli-
tics.1 As a consequence, a large body 
of literature has grown up on this 
topic.2 Most of this literature is his-
torical,3 with only a small body of 
psychological or behavior studies.4 
1. Although some authors prefer to date 
international terrorism from the French 
Revolution, and in so doing stress its connec-
tion with the emergence of nationalism, it is 
properly considered a post-World War I phe-
nomenon. Prior to that time, terrorism was 
used by small groups protesting selected po-
litical orders; afterward, the protest was 
dramatically broadened to include almost all 
forms of violence directed at established 
regimes in general. For a concise view, see J. 
Boyer Bell, Transnatianal Terror (Stanford, 
CA: Hoover Institution, 1975). 
2. For recent compendiums, see Edward 
F. Mickolus, Annotated Bibliography on 
Transnational and International Terrorism 
(Washington, DC: Central Intelligence 
Agency, 1976); M. Cherif Bassouni, ed., Inter-
national Terrorism and Political Crimes 
(Springfield, IL: Charles C Thomas, 1975); 
Yonah Alexander and Seymour M. Finger, 
eds., Terrorism: Interdisciplinary Perspec-
tives (New York: John Jay Press, 1977); 
Robert A. Freidlander, ed., Terrorism Docu-
ments of Internatianal and Local Cantrol, 
2 vols. (Dobbs Ferry, NY: Oceana, 1979); 
Augustus R. Norton and Martin H. Green-
berg, eds., International Terrorism: An 
Annotated Bibliography and Research Guide 
(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1980); 
Richard H. Schultz and Stephen Sloan, eds., 
Respanding to the Terrorist Threat: Security 
and Crisis Management (New York: Per-
gamon Press, 1980); Yonah Alexander and 
John M. Gleason, eds., Behavioral and Quan-
titative Perspectives on Terrorism (New 
York: Pergamon Press, 1981 ). 
3. For example, the work of Walter 
Laqueur, Terrorism (Boston: Little, Brown, 
1977). 
4. On the psychological approach see, for 
example, Abraham Kaplan, "The Psychody-
namics of Terrorism," Terrorism, 1, 3, and 
4:237-58 (1978); for one of the better quantita-
tive summaries, see Charles A. Russell and 
Bowman H. Miller, "Profiles of Terrorists," 
Military Review, Aug. 1977, pp. 21-34. 
Additionally, much of the work is 
broken down by world areas and 
consists of case studies or anecdotal 
descriptions.5 Finally, there is a 
much smaller, specialized literature 
concerning the measures to be 
employed against terrorists.6 Taken 
as a whole, then, this literature is 
unfocused.7 
Part of the reason for this unfo-
cused quality is that there is no sin-
gle accepted definition of the topic 
itself. Each discipline, even each 
writer, tends to treat terrorism, 
local or international, from a given, 
narrow perspective shaped by the 
parameters of the discipline or the 
author's orientation. But part is also 
due to the nature of terrorism itself. 
As Jenkins has pointed out, ter-
rorism involves acts which in them-
selves are crimes, specifically, 
violent crimes. This criminal vio-
lence is then coupled with a set of 
demands, and the perpetrators in 
question generally go to some 
lengths to publicize both their 
responsibility for the crimes and 
their demands. Moreover, almost all 
terrorist attacks are the product of 
advanced organization; in a strictly 
criminal law sense, they are pre-
meditated and the product of an 
extended conspiracy.8 So far, these 
5. For example, Colin Smith, Carlos: 
Portrait of a Terrorist (New York: Holt, Rine-
hart and Winston, 1976); Christopher Dob-
son, Black September: Its Short, Violent 
History (New York: Macmillan, 1974); or 
Claire Sterling, The Terrorist Network (New 
York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1981). 
6. For instance, Report of the Task 
Force on Disorders and Terrorism, Disorders 
and Terrorism (Washington, DC: National 
Advisory Committee on Criminal Justice 
Standards). 
7. But there are brilliant individual 
exceptions. See Paul Wilkinson, Political 
Terrorism(New York: John Wiley, 1974). 
8. On the implications of this, see D. U. 
Segre and J. H. Adler, "The Ecology of Ter-
rorism," Encounter, 401:17-24 (Feb. 1973). 
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM 
acts would-or could-fit into exist-
ing criminal law frameworks. How-
ever, terrorism involves one more 
element, that of a claimed political 
motive, and on the basis of that 
motive, a claimed immunity from 
standard law enforcement.9 It is the 
combination of crime and political 
motive that has led to definitional 
problems and, consequently, to 
problems of enforcement.10 
Where the terrorist act is perpe-
trated in an international context, 
the problem is even more complex 
because of contrasting political 
values. As one author put it: "One 
man's terrorism is another man's 
heroism."11 Two sorts of problems 
are involved here. First, there is the 
problem of the "right" to rebel 
against oppressive governments, 
whether native or colonial.12 Also, 
9. See Richard H. Schultz and Stephen 
Sloan, "International Terrorism: The Nature 
of the Threat," in Schultz and Sloan, 
Responding to the Terror-ist Threat, pp. 1-17; 
and Brian M. Jenkins, "The Study of Terror-
ism: Definitional Problems," in Alexander 
and Gleason, Behavioral and Quantitative 
Perspectives on Terrorism, pp. 3-10. 
10. For contrasting approaches to defin-
ing terrorism, see R.R. Baxter, "A Skeptical 
Look at the Concept of Terrorism," Akron 
Law Review, 7(3):380-87 (Spring 1974); Jor-
dan J. Paust, "An Approach to Decision in 
Regard to Terrorism,'' Akron Law Review, 
7(3):397-403 (Spring 1974). 
11. John F. Murphy "International Legal 
Controls of International Terrorism: Perfor-
mance and Prospects," The Illinois Bar Jour-
nal, Apr. 1975, pp. 444-52. 
12. This is sometimes also expressed as 
the issue of state terrorism: at what point are 
the activities of a state, as distinct from private 
individuals, to be considered "terrorism" 
when directed either at its own population or 
against populations in neighboring coun-
tries? As can readily be seen from this formu-
lation, this issue is bound up with a complex 
of definitions and value judgments about the 
appropriate role of governmental force, the 
nature of government legitimacy in general, 
and the use of force in international relations. 
With respect to the problem of dealing with 
fugitives who claim asylum because they are 
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there is the problem of the right of 
self-determination: at what point 
are colonial or excolonial popula-
tions entitled to use violence1a 
against Western "imperialists"? As 
long as there is a preconceived con-
nection between the use of terrorism 
as an extension of insurgent war,14 
there will be continued resistance 
by Third World states to the imposi-
tion of strictly enforced sanctions 
against terrorists who attack West-
ern targets.16 
To summarize the situation in 
international terrorism from the 
viewpoint of the literature, there 
exists a substantial body of material 
in which the phenomenon is de-
scribed, analyzed, defined, and pro-
jected from the viewpoints of widely 
different intellectual disciplines 
running the gamut from history 
through law, sociology, psychology, 
"political offenders" in their home country, 
see Manuel R. Garcia-Mora, "The Problem of 
Political Offenses: A Knotty Problem of 
Extradition Law,'' Virginia Law Review, 48: 
1226-57 (1962); and "The Present Status of 
Political Offenses in the Law of Extradition 
and Asylum,'' University of Pittsburgh Law 
Review, 14:371-96 (1953). 
13. The term "violence" is subject to its 
own definitional problems. See Henry 
Bienen, Violence and Social Change (Chi-
cago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1968); 
Criminal Violence, eds. Marvin E. Wolfgang 
and Alan Weiner (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 
1982); and Marvin E. Wolfgang and Franco 
Ferracuti, The Subculture of Violence (Bev-
erly Hills, CA: Sage, 1982). 
14. As Jenkins has demonstrated, this 
connection is by no means a simple one: insur-
gent warfare and its terrorist extensions have 
become a new style of strategic conflict 
waged by proxy. Brian Jenkins, Interna-
tional Terrorism: A New Kind of Warfare 
(Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 1974). 
15. Robert A. Freidlandtir, "Terrorism 
and International Law: What is Being Done?" 
Rutgers-Camden Law Journal, 8:383-92 
(1977); Jordan J. Paust, "A Survey of Possible 
Legal Responses to International Terrorism: 
Prevention, Punishment, and Cooperative 
Action," Georgia Journal of International 
and Comparative Law, 5 (1975). 
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and political science to probability 
and statistics. The same body of 
literature contains only a small 
amount of material on the subject of 
the application of controls from the 
viewpoint and direction of the states 
under attack. International ter-
rorism may perhaps be considered 
to have been adequately studied. 
Indeed, the subject may be said to 
have been studied to death. From 
the viewpoint of controls applied by 
the states under attack, fortunately, 
various governments have devel-
oped and applied effective counter-
measures that have been supported 
by the corpus of descriptive mate-
rial, but that have suffered from the 
lack of studies involving compre-
hensive consideration of the applica-
tion of controls. Comprehensive and 
systemic controls over international 
terrorism suggest the requirement 
for a broad and realistic model of 
terrorist and government action and 
emphasis on concrete controls 
rather than studies that stop at de-
scriptions of the phenomenon. 
Perhaps the most effective frame-
work of action both broad and realis-
tic enough to stimulate an accurate 
appreciation of the alternatives for 
control is an historical one. Figure 1 
presents, accordingly, a simplified 
view of the historical framework of 
terrorism. The figure shows that the 
considerations and actions that com-
prise international terrorism 
develop in real, that is, historical, 
time and involve a wide range of 
activity that can be analyzed most 
naturally and drawn together most 
usefully under the umbrella of his-
tory. The figure is laid out as a band 
of international terrorist activity 
unfolding in real time and involving 
several systematically determined 
categories of consideration and 
action on the part of the adversaries. 
In order to extract useful guides to 
the control of international ter-
rorism, we have centered the model 
on a single "terrorist incident," 
sketching in around it the more gen-
eral historical framework and, in 
systematic detail, the necessary con-
siderations and actions on the part of 
the human adversaries in the histor-
ical confrontation. 
Understanding that the interna-
tional terrorist confrontation is part 
of a complex picture of human 
development, which is sketched in 
lightly in Figure 1 as the unfulfilled 
and continuing lines of considera-
tion for possible future terror, we 
center attention on six categories of 
consideration and action on the part 
of governments against terrorists: 
(1) political policy, (2) law, (3) police 
(law enforcement), (4) news media, 
(5) foreign policy, and (6) military 
action. We examine each of the cate-
gories from the viewpoint of the 
alternatives for control of the hypo-
thetical representative terrorist 
incident in the center of the band of 
activity in Figure 1. A representa-
tive international terrorist incident 
involving the U.S. government 
would be the January 1982 assassi-
nation in Paris, France of the U.S. 
assistant defense attache by a group 
claiming to be part of a Lebanese 
political organization. 
Forewarned in the particular 
incident by the earlier attempted as-
sassination of the U.S. charge d' 
affaires in what proved to be a sim-
ilar tactical modus operandi-
namely, a single assassin armed 
with a handgun attacking in a pub-
lic street-the U.S. government was 
faced with a range of alternatives 
concerning both its overall political 
policy in France relative to interna-
tional terrorism and its immediate 
policy with respect to an attempted 
assassination. Within the model of 
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U.S. government found itself at the 
extreme left side of the band of 
activity, considering essentially 
what policy to effect within the 
framework of a locally accelerated 
situation of international terror. 
The situation can be visualized as a 
classic one in strategy in which an 
objective must be clearly envisioned 
and described, and must serve as the 
guide for all parties to the situation. 
In conjunction with the State 
Department, the U.S. government 
in France-the embassy, consular 
service, and so on-was forced to 
articulate the objective to be 
achieved and the general course of 
action to be followed in combating 
international terrorism in France. 
Faced with the necessity to artic-
ulate a counterterrorist strategy, 
governments can be seen to have an 
infinite range of alternative actions 
that might be pursued. Fortunately 
for them, the entire range of actions 
can be categorized as either !'!ffec-
tive or ineffective from the point of 
view of controlling international 
terrorism. It is probably not too 
much to say that an effective objec-
tive of government counterterrorist 
policy is the prevention of acts of 
terror, and to suggest that such a 
statement of policy, even within the 
framework of government reaction 
to a terrorist incident, can serve as a 
viable and decisive strategic objec-
tive. The point is more subtle than it 
may appear at first glance. A 
human tendency exists to view ter-
rorist incidents from the tactical 
perspective of the details unique to 
the ongoing incident, particularly in 
barricade, hostage, and kidnapping 
situations. The result of such a ten-
dency has been concentration on 
reducing loss of life and damage in 
each particular incident at the 
expense of deterring terrorism by a 
broad, consistent strategy aimed at 
making all incidents unattractive to 
terrorists.16 
TERRORISTS' EXPLOITATION OF 
THE MEDIA 
As a guide to the control of inter-
national terrorism, the question 
may be asked, What goals are 
achieved by political groups 
employing international terror, or 
alternatively, what makes interna-
tional terror attractive to such 
groups? Perhaps the single most sig-
nificant attraction of the terrorist 
incident is publicity for the terrorist 
organization, including its very 
existence, its goals, and its enemies. 
Publicity can be seen generally to 
rank above the goal of forcing a 
target government to carry out some 
immediate action, for example, 
release of prisoners, distribution of 
food, or payment of tribute. In an era 
in which the news media have 
become overwhelming in their pres-
ence and effects in terms of televi-
sion, radio, the cinema, newspapers, 
and news magazines, the publicity 
afforded by the terrorist incident is 
incalculable. 17 It is therefore 
appropriate to consider the alterna-
tives for control of international ter-
rorism in terms of the government 
strategy for dealing with the news 
media during both periods of 
quiescence-that is, no existing ter-
rorist incidents-and periods of gov-
ernment response in dealing with 
active terrorist incidents. 
When an incident has taken place 
that bears the unmistakable signs of 
16. See the comments along these lines in 
Task Force, Disorders and Terrorism, pp. 29-
35. 
17. For analyses along these lines, see 
Yonah Alexander, "Terrorism, the Media 
and the Police," Police Studies, 1(2):45-62 
(Jun.1978); and "Communications Aspects of 
Functional Terrorism," International Prob-
lems, 16(1-2):55-60 (Spring 1977). 
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an international act of terror, the 
government with jurisdiction has a 
range of alternatives for dealing 
with the situation. These run 
between two extremes: (1) no con-
trols over news media and (2) total 
blackout of information. The former 
extreme, which may be referred to 
as an information glut, represents 
an advantage to virtually all ter-
rorist groups and comprises in 
many cases the predominant goal: 
publicity for the terrorists. The lat-
ter extreme, which may be referred 
to as total control, presents tremen-
dous potential advantages to a gov-
ernment under attack by denying a 
basic rationale for the terrorists in 
conceiving, planning, and launch-
ing a terrorist incident, as well as by 
denying many advantages to the ter-
rorists within an ongoing incident. 
Total control of communications, 
however, is anathema to the funda-
mental principles of a democratic 
order. The relationship between the 
authorities responsible for control-
ling or limiting the media impact of 
a terrorist act and the news media 
presents one of the thorniest prob-
lems in dealing with terrorism. In 
the United States, a considerable 
body of law has grown up around 
this problem in the context of the 
First Amendment rights of speech 
and assembly. The general rule ap-
plied to instances where the exercise 
of these rights would produce a 
danger of civil disorder is that gov-
ernment officials, upon proper 
showing of the danger, can curb the 
rights. Such a rule offers some 
guidelines, but given that terrorist 
strategy is to exploit certain charac-
teristics of contemporary mass 
media, especially those characteris-
tics having to do with immediate vis-
ual impact and broad scope of 
dissemination, a new set of guide-
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lines will have to be developed.18 It 
may well be that news coverage may 
be restricted, not by its content, 
which would clearly violate both the 
spirit and the letter of guarantees of 
free speech, but by media character-
istics and transmission range.19 
It is difficult to imagine terrorists 
engaging in a wide range of interna-
tional terrorist activity in which no 
publicity would be forthcoming in 
the news media. It is equally diffi-
cult to imagine a situation in which a 
government with jurisdiction, for 
example, France, and a government 
under direct attack, for example, 
the United States, would attempt to 
enforce total control. It is easier to 
imagine a situation with rules of 
engagement, developed by govern-
ments, that would allow the news 
media or some of them to report 
systematically selected information 
to the public but that would deny 
publicity and propaganda effects to 
the terrorists. Potential charges of 
arbitrary behavior on the part of the 
executive branch of the government 
could be overcome by coordinating 
committees of executive branch 
officials, judges, and legislators who 
would (1) rule on the existence of a 
terrorist incident, as opposed to 
ordinary criminality, accident, and 
so on; and (2) determine the extent 
18. Task Force, Disorders and Terrorism, 
pp. 65-68, considers this problem in some 
detail. 
19. In the United States, both of these 
have been the subject of administrative regu-
lation for some time, without excessive inter-
ference with First Amendment rights. Note 
that there is some research on the impact of 
media, among other factors, on the diffusion 
of terrorism, specifically on the imitation 
effect in connection with terrorist acts. See 
Edward Heyman and Edward Mickolus, 
"Imitation by Terrorists: Quantitative 
Approaches to the Study of Diffusion Pat-
terns in Transnational Terrorism," in Alex-
ander and Gleason, Perspectives on 
Terrorism, pp. 175-228. 
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and duration of the controls over the 
news media. In effect, the com-
mittees would have the power to 
declare a carefully circumscribed 
state of emergency surrounding the 
terrorist incident that would involve 
the release of the least damaging 
material to the news media and have 
the specific purpose of discouraging 
the terrorists from repeating such 
incidents for their media value, that 
is, publicity and propaganda.20 But 
again, it cannot be emphasized too 
strongly that governmental policies 
must be extremely sensitive to the 
dangers of restricting the news flow 
in a free society. It may be that these 
dangers outweigh any gains achieved 




Perhaps the most important cate-
gories of consideration and action by 
governments under attack by inter-
national terrorists are those of law 
and law enforcement. Such govern-
ments have enormous leeway for 
imaginative thinking both on the 
application of the law and on the 
operations of law enforcement 
authorities. The alternatives range 
from the unmodified application of 
ordinary criminal law through the 
declaration of emergency security 
zones and the passage of laws 
increasing the authority of law 
enforcement officials. The argu-
ment, of course, that has constrained 
U.S. lawmakers and law enforce-
ment authorities to remain within 
the outskirts of unmodified criminal 
law is that the treatment of interna-
tional teror through change in law 
and law enforcement mustautomat-
20. Task Force, Disorders and Terrorism, 
suggests this approach. 
ically be accompanied by the unac-
ceptable danger of abuse of the 
increased authority, that is, that the 
possible cure is worse than the 
disease.21 In an era characterized by 
the geometric advance of applied 
knowledge (technology), as well as 
experimentation with alternatives 
in most areas of human experience, 
it is incongruous for states under 
attack by international political ter-
rorists not to have a preselected set 
of legal and law enforcement alter-
natives.22 
Understanding the need for cau-
tion in applying legal and law 
enforcement alternatives while fac-
ing the necessity for action beyond 
the present laws and constraints, the 
leaders of modern states are con-
fronted with a situation in which 
they must plan in advance a flexible 
graded legal response to interna-
tional terrorism. Alternatives for 
control include both substantive 
actions and imaginative new con-
cepts in the application of law. It is 
not unreasonable to suggest, for 
example, the possibility of a state 
declaring acts of international ter-
ror not only as criminal but also as 
21. Along these lines, see Clive C. Aston, 
"Restrictions Encountered in Responding to 
Terrorists Seiges: An Analysis," in Schultz 
and Sloan, Responding to the Terrorist 
Threat, pp. 59-92; and George Schwartzen-
berger, "Hijackers, Guerreros and Mercen-
aries," Current Legal Problems, 24:257-82 
(1971) for the argument that unless the gov-
ernmental response is very carefully con-
trolled, terrorism "almost invariably begats 
counterterrorism and sets in motion a 
downward spiral towards intensified compe-
tition of all concerned in the refinements of 
barbarism." Also see John B. Wolf, "Control-
ling Political Terrorism in a Free Society," 
Orbis, 19:1289-1308 (Winter 1976); Paul Wil-
kinson, Terrorists and the Liberal State (New 
York: John Wiley, 1977). 
22. This is, of course, the thrust of the 
National Advisory Committee argument. See 
Task Force, Disorders and Terrorism, pp. 
409-16. 
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM 
embodying special elements of 
danger that require special law 
enforcement authority internally 
and international cooperation exter-
nally.2s The contention by some po-
litical groups that they are using 
international terror as a legitimate 
political weapon can be negated by 
defining a class of such acts as crimi-
nal and therefore subject to prosecu-
tion. 24 Within the framework of 
analysis sketched previously, the 
following range of alternatives 
exists for selective, graded applica-
tion: special26 intelligence gather-
ing, 26 special authority in 
investigation, special training and 
techniques in international terrorist 
search and confrontation, additions 
to or changes in the law that contrib-
ute to the effectiveness of the law 
enforcement authorities, and con-
sideration of the special detention of 
23. See, for example, the proposal put 
forth some years ago by Luis L. Kutner, "Con-
structive Notice: A Proposal to End Interna-
tional Terrorism," New York Law Forum, 
19:325-54 (1973). 
24. As does the 1972 West German anti-
terrorist legislation. See Subcommittees on 
Criminal Laws and Procedures, West Ger-
many's Political Response to Terrorism 
(Washington, DC: Government Printing 
Office, 1978). 
25. The word "special," as used here, is 
meant to have the connotation of being ap-
plied to situations of international terrorist 
threat and action. 
26. This, of course, raises the issue of to 
what extent a government is entitled to 
invade an individual's privacy. But the extent 
of this invasion can be handled in terms of 
local search and seizure law. See the compar-
ative cases in Ronald D. Crelinsten etal., eds., 
Terrorism and Criminal Justice: An Inter-
national Perspective (Lexington, MA: Lex-
ington Books, 1978); Frank Gregory, Protest 
and Violence: The Police Response-A Com-
parative Analysis of Democratic Methods 
(London: Institute for the Study of Conflict, 
1976); H.H.A. Cooper, "Terrorism and the 
Intelligence Function," Chitty's Law Jour-
nal, 73:24-35 (Mar. 1976), discusses the prob-
lems of intelligence problems in a free 
society. 
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suspects in international terrorist 
investigations. 
THE FOREIGN POLICY 
COMPONENT: JURISDICTION 
AND DETERRENCE 
In situations involving interna-
tional terrorism, news media, law, 
and law enforcement alternatives 
for control are subject to unique 
loopholes in terms of the relation-
ship between the government under 
attack and the one with jurisdiction. 
In the incident of January 1982, for 
example, involving the assassina-
tion of the U.S. assistant defense 
attache in Paris, the French 
government possesses jurisdiction 
and will press the investigation 
according to its style, motives, and 
energy. Such an investigation in-
volves relatively more important 
matters for the U.S. government-
the one under direct attack-and yet 
it is constrained to be a bystander in 
the protection of its own interests. 
Such a situation largely rebounds to 
the benefits of the international ter-
rorists and demands alternatives to 
the ad hoc independent operations of 
two different governments. The gov-
ernments of states under attack 
overseas require a strategy compris-
ing a range of foreign policy options 
in third party states designed (1) to 
reduce the attractiveness of terror 
and (2) to counter successfully ter-
rorist attacks once they have taken 
place in third party states. 
Many alternatives for the control 
of international terrorism exist 
within the area of foreign policy 
initiatives designed to reduce the 
attractiveness of terrorist acts. One 
of the most prevalent forms of inter-
national terror has been the kidnap-
ping for ransom of employees of the 
more advanced states working over-
seas, particularly in South Amer-
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ica.27 The U.S. government has 
established a policy of not paying 
ransom, and it is difficult to escape 
the conclusion that such a policy has 
severely discouraged attacks 
against U.S. government employees 
and officials with the purpose of 
extracting ransom. The same gov-
ernment, however, has neglected to 
formulate a similar foreign policy 
that would forbid U.S. commercial 
enterprises operating overseas from 
paying ransom for kidnapped, non-
government employees.28 Although 
legal questions concerning the 
authority of governments represent-
ing states under attack to enforce 
anti-ransom and similar policies 
would arise, and significant hur-
dles would have to be mastered in 
coordinating such policy with the 
governments possessing jurisdic-
tion, it can be seen that potentially 
viable but untried alternatives exist 
to control kidnapping and other ter-
rorist actions. Governments under 
attack, for example, have numerous 
other options, including financial 
aid to commercial enterprises under 
potential attack in foreign countries 
27. See, for example, International Ter-
rorism in 1977 (Washington, DC: Central 
Intelligence Agency, 1978), pp. 2, 4, 6, 10, 
which summarize 10 years of international 
terrorism. 
28. See Yonah Alexander and John M. 
Gleason, "Introduction," in Behavioral and 
Quantitative Perspectives, pp. xvii-xviii. 
According to Alexander and Gleason, the 
business community is the most vulnerable of 
all terrorist targets. Between 1970 and 1980, 
45 percent of all terrorist acts were business-
connected. There is a growing body of litera-
ture dealing with the protection of business 
executives and installations: E. H. Adkins, 
Jr., "Protection of American Industrial Dig-
nitaries and Facilities Overseas," Security 
Management, 18:14-16 (Jul. 1974); Paul 
Fuqua and Jerry Wilson, The Executive's 
Guide to Survival (Houston: Gulf, 1978); F. 
Rayne, "Executive Protection and Terror-
ism," Top Security, 1:220-25 (Oct. 1975). 
and specific action to reduce the 
attractiveness and possibility of 
bombing, barricade and hostage 
situations, armed attack, break-in, 
sniping, and other actions. Specific 
options include government support 
for the hardening of selected instal-
lations, the employment of special 
indigenous security personnel, 
information networks, antiterrorist 
propaganda, rewards, and so on. 
In a somewhat more conventional 
mode, states under direct attack in 
foreign areas and the states occupy-
ing those areas and having jurisdic-
tion have many alternatives for the 
control of international terrorism 
through bilateral as well as multi-
lateral agreements. In a potentially 
useful analogy, the governments 
under direct attack and those with 
jurisdiction operate with interests 
similar to those of states with status 
of forces and data exchange agree-
ments. Such a style of understand-
ing has become common between 
the United States and several for-
eign states in which terrorism has 
reached dangerous levels-for 
example, West Germany, Italy, and 
France-and suggests a similar 
pragmatic approach to cooperation 
over the issue of international ter-
rorism.29 Bilateral executive agree-
29. Vittorfranco S. Pisano, Contemporary 
Italian Terrorism: Analysis and Counter-
measures (Washington, DC: Library of Con-
gress, 1979), pp. 93-100, suggests strong and 
well-established overseas connections on the 
part of Italian terrorist organizations. The 
remainder of the material concentrates on the 
domestic legal controls available to the Ital-
ian authorities. The foreign and domestic 
legal ramifications of Italian terrorism are 
covered, but the subject of international coop-
eration and control is noticeable by its 
absence. See also the material in Claire Ster-
ling, The Terrorist Network: The Secret War 
of International Terrorism (New York, 1981), 
which documents the international connec-
tions and targets of many terrorist organiza-
tions and suggests measures of international 
control. 
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ments negotiated at the intermedi-
ate level of authority by technically 
and operationally oriented person-
nel could (1) fill in numerous gaps in 
the static defenses of the govern-
ments under attack, and (2) foster 
the development of an offensive stra-
tegy designed to carry an effectively 
conceived and coordinated attack by 
those governments against terrorist 
organizations. 
The defense of states under attack 
could be improved by agreements 
that extract special policies and 
actions from the states with jurisdic-
tion. Within the framework of the 
applicable law, the governments of 
the jurisdictional states would then 
have systematic alternatives for the 
protection of foreign embassies and 
properties that could be spelled out 
in bilateral agreements. The 
affected governments could define 
existing levels of terrorist threat, for 
example, ongoing terrorist incident, 
impending terrorist operations, 
general threat, and quiescence, and 
could structure both short- and long-
term alternatives for control. An 
unpalatable but effective short-
term response would be the setting 
aside of the writ of habeas corpus by 
law in cases involving investigation 
of terrorist incidents-that is, per-
sons suspected of terrorist activity 
could be detained for the period 
established by law-although this 
draconian measure might not be 
necessary since ordinary penal leg-
islation provides for some period of 
detention before an arraignment is 
required. The establishment of lev-
els of terrorist threat by govern-
ments would be open to debate and 
controversy, but once the levels were 
established they would support sys-
tematic and appropriately forceful 
responses to international ter-
rorism. The resulting alternatives 
for control within the framework of 
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executive agreements between two 
foreign states are vast and include 
the setting up of pervasive counter-
terrorist information networks, the 
employment of appropriate existing 
law enforcement forces in addi-
tional missions in defense against 
terrorism, and the development of 
special counterterrorist surveil-
lance, evasion, and protection tech-
niques. 
Pervasive information networks 
involving systematic saturation of 
appropriate cities and city areas 
with volunteer informants and 
professional controllers could be set 
up on the basis of costs shared 
between the governments under 
direct attack and those with juris-
diction. Existing law enforcement 
forces have been reorganized, for 
example, in the case of the quasi-
m i li tary West German border 
defense and law enforcement units 
trained and used for special opera-
tions against terrorists. In Paris, 
possibilities exist for counterter-
rorist employment of 2000 men of 
the city police force who are 
retained normally for employment 
on riot control duty and organized 
into 18 intervention companies 
covering the nine city districts.ao 
Under appropriate agreements, 
such a force could provide special 
protective vehicles and equipment 
in support of foreign embassies and 
effect a massive uniformed presence 
for brief, irregular periods of time. 
Terrorist attacks have also <level-
30. See R. H. Stolfi et al., Gradient and 
Less Lethal Devices in Control of Urban Vio-
lence (Aberdeen, MD: U.S. Army Ballistic 
Research Laboratory, 1973), pp. 45-59. Note 
also that a variety of special organizations 
have been set up in other states for employ-
ment against both domestic and international 
terrorists, including, for example, the Spe-
cial Air Service (SAS) in the United King-
dom and the Blue Light units in the United 
States. 
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oped in well-defined patterns that 
provide security forces with clues to 
the effective disruption of many ter-
rorist operations.31 Terrorist assas-
sinations, armed attacks, and 
kidnappings almost without excep-
tion depend on lengthy surveillance 
of the intended targets specifically 
in order to discover a persistent 
pattern of activity.a2 With the coor-
dination and additional resources 
available under executive agree-
ments, governments can cooperate 
systematically to disrupt such oper-
ations by countersurveillance and 
the enforcement and support of ran-
dom changes in activity. 
Concerted action on the part of 
governments under direct and indi-
rect attack is perhaps most impor-
tant from the perspective of 
applying pressure on states that, by 
default or action, support interna-
tional terrorists. Concerted action is 
also necessary for the development 
of offensive operations intended to 
seize the initiative from the ter-
rorists and carry the battle to them. 
Governments under attack can 
effect bilateral or possibly multilat-
eral action in the form of economic 
sanctions and political pressures 
against states supporting ter-
rorism.33 Such a strategy of the indi-
rect approach against international 
terrorism has great promise for con-
trol of the phenomenon. The stra-
tegy is particularly effective 
31. See, for example, Brian Jenkins, Jan-
era Johnson, and David Ronfeldt, "Num-
bered Lives: Some Statistical Observations 
from 77 International Hostage Episodes," 
Conflict, 1:71-111 (1968). 
32. Thomas Strentz, "The Terrorist 
Organizational Profile: A Psychological Role 
Model," in Alexander and Gleason, Behav-
ioral and Quantitative Perspectives. 
33. The March 1982 decision of the Rea-
gan administration to suspend imports of 
Libyan oil is an excellent example of an 
attempt at intellectual control. 
because it brings to bear the power 
of states under attack uninhibited 
by constraints inherent in pursuing 
terrorists under rules of criminal 
procedure designed to protect ordi-
nary citizens from the misapplica-
tion of state power. Under 
international agreement, concerted 
action by states operating against 
terrorists encourages offensive 
operations that can be characterized 
by propaganda and psychological 
wara4 and by less palatable but occa-
sional direct action, varying from 
Israeli-style action against Palesti-
nians in Beirut to the less controver-
sial West German-style action in 
retrieving hostages at Mogadishu, 
in the Somali Republic. 
The role of military forces in com-
bating international terrorism 
remains simultaneously limited and 
open-ended. The armed forces of the 
highly modernized greater states35 
have missions dedicated almost 
entirely to the external defense of 
the state. However, because of their 
fundamental attitudes, the ground 
forces of those states are well suited 
for the support of counterterrorist 
operations. British ground forces 
that have become engaged in a situa-
tion of intense, indigenous-as 
opposed to international-terrorist 
operations in Northern Ireland 
quickly acclimatized themselves to 
urban terror and have kept the polit-
34. In the Middle East, a number of Gulf 
states have pooled their resources and set up 
their own version of INTERPOL in an effort 
to combat Palestinian and Iranian-inspired 
attacks on oil installations. In this connection, 
see John K. Cooley, "Iran, the Palestinians 
and the Gulf," Foreign Affairs, 57(5):1017-34 
(Summer 1979); The Impact of Iranian 
Events upon Persian Gulf and United States 
Security (Washington, DC: American For-
eign Policy Institute, 1979). 
35. States such as West Germany, Bri-
tain, France, Italy, the Soviet Union, the 
United States, and Japan. 
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ical initiative in that area in the 
hands of the British government. In 
the less intense milieu of interna-
tional terrorism, military forces can 
provide specialized, elite detach-
ments dedicated to the defense of 
unusual but important targets, such 
as petroleum platforms at sea, port 
facilities, and air terminals, and can 
provide the attack against heavily 
armed terrorists in barricade, hos-
tage, and similar confrontations. 
CONCLUSION 
In summary, it can be said that 
international terrorism has been 
studied .intensively as an important 
modern phenomenon. Many who 
have studied the phenomenon have 
come to understand it, but none has 
put together an interpretation from 
which a guiding strategy for control 
can be derived. The concept of a 
strategy with its implied decisive 
objectives may indeed by the miss-
ing element, because the alterna-
* * 
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tives for control of international 
terrorism are myriad. At its 
extreme right side, Figure 1 shows 
the government results from follow-
ing a line of action or strategy to 
bring a terrorist incident to a suc-
cessful conclusion. The figure shows 
that the government must select 
alternatives for control from at least 
six categories of action and further 
indicates, by the straight line lead-
ing from the incident, that the alter-
natives chosen are unique for each 
confrontation. The task of the 
moment for governments chal-
lenged by international terrorists is 
to formulate a decisive strategy that 
leads to success in the day-to-day 
contact and dramatic incidents that 
characterize international terror. 
Success itself is an elusive concept, 
but it can be secured in the case of 
international terrorism by a stra-
tegy that (1) prevents terrorist inci-
dents from taking place by making 
them unattractive to the perpetra-
tors and (2) achieves successful out-
comes to ongoing terrorist incidents. 
* 
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 
Q: I am Dr. Needleman from 
Newman College. What I have 
heard about so far is what I would 
call petite terrorism, for want of a 
better term. What I am personally 
concerned with is what I would call 
grand terrorism. This is not the 
shooting of a particular official, but 
rather the kind of terrorism in 
which an atomic power station is 
taken over and forced into some kind 
of China Syndrome or Apollo Syn-
drome, or atomic materials are 
stolen, some kind of an atomic device 
is released, or if that is too sophisti-
cated, simply the poisoning of a local 
water supply system. All these 
things seem to be quite possible and 
probable in the context of the 
assumptions I have heard thus far. 
A (Stolfi): In the historical sense, 
it is possible that conditions will 
move in a way that the thing you 
suggest may not happen at all. That 
is something about which I took 
issue this morning with Dr. Kupper-
man. He was talking ominously of 
portents of doom, indicating that if 
you had a terrorist organization that 
conducted what was formerly a dra-
matic incident-hostages barri-
caded inside an aircraft-it would 
not get any press coverage anymore. 
What is suggested by that line of 
reasoning is that the terrorist 
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line of reasoning is that the terrorist 
organization must escalate and 
attack liquid or natural gas con-
tainer ships or something like that. I 
do not see that as necessarily being 
part of a realistic historical picture. 
Those people can grow older, mel-
lower, die in jail, new movements 
could come up, and so forth. One has 
to be very careful about making 
forecasts. A historical answer would 
be no, it does not necessarily follow 
that there will be an escalation. On 
the other hand, one can see certain 
types of incidents in certain cases 
which have been forms of escalation. 
Hence, there are two ways you can 
look at it. There is a natural way of 
saying it has got to be bigger and 
better, but it does not necessarily 
follow. 
Q: I am John Grice from Guilford 
College. Brian Jenkins, in a recent 
article, "Will Terrorists Go 
Nuclear?" says no, what the ter-
rorists want is a lot of attention, a lot 
of publicity, and not a lot of casual-
ties. If we are to control the press, as 
you suggest, may they not then be 
tempted toward grand terrorism in 
order to get the publicity? After all, 
the reason the Russians don't need to 
broadcast their takeover of Western 
Europe is that everybody noticed it. 
A (Stolfi): That is tough logic. 
Perhaps you have a committee that 
is headed by a judge, a lawyer, or a 
representative of the press to deter-
mine in some kind of effective way 
how and when to cover an interna-
tional incident, and the press says 
fine, we will play along and not pub-
licize this. If you imagine that some-
thing like that could happen, then in 
order to get publicity, an incident of 
necessity has got to be so big that 
there is no way that it can be hidden. 
Q: The thing that I am concerned 
about is the increasing technological 
sophistication of terrorist groups. 
You look back at Andreas Baader 
and Marie Meinhof and the like. 
They came out of the old anti-war, 
anti-Shah peace movements, and in 
fact they were all known to the 
police. Anybody out of that kind of 
group who takes on the German 
police has to be insane. But look at 
the third generation of terrorists 
that we now find not only in West 
Germany but in Western Europe 
generally. They are architects, engi-
neers, and lawyers during the day 
and go out in the evening and build 
bombs and the like. Moreover, they 
have much more technical sophisti-
cation. Hence, I think it is a distinct 
possibility for the type of grand out-
rage that you are talking about to 
occur. Maybe not the China Syn-
drome thing. That isn't the kind of 
thing that concerns me greatly, but 
container ships, a major power cen-
ter, and the like, these are very vul-
nerable. 
A (Stolfi): One has to acknowl-
edge that there is an attraction for 
the more dramatic target. However, 
gaining access to nuclear materials 
may not be necessary at all; there 
are other, more dramatic incidents, 
let us say a big tanker, an oil rig in 
the North Sea, or a liquid natural 
gas ship. However, in spite of the 
people associated with some of these 
movements, there are terrible prob-
lems in creating such an incident. 
There is one other interesting 
point. Within the terrorist groups 
themselves, you must remember 
that these things are historical orga-
nisms that are changing and mov-
ing. Let us say Baader is dead today. 
If there has been a replacement or 
somebody else is in that organiza-
tion, is he necessarily a person who 
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has learned and is more technically 
advanced? Instead of performing a 
single assassination, he would prob-
ably crawl before he would walk. So 
you can imagine historical situa-
tions in which the level of intensity 
of the events and so on might not get 
much bigger. Unfortunately, it is 
certainly possible that some dra-
matic, bigger event might take 
place. But the terrorists have prob-
lems, just like anybody else, in car-
rying out things like that. 
COMMENT (Lambert): I was 
interested that you tend to think 
of terrorism on American soil as 
largely what was referred to in the 
earlier articles as third-party 
terrorism, that is, terrorism 
directed by the Croats against other 
Croats, but on American soil. Do we 
not have enough social tensions in 
our own society that there could be 
the development of internal targets 
for terrorism, and not just terrorism 
imported to our shores? 
Q: Gerald Post, George Washing-
ton University. The question about 
superterror and crisis reaction. 
While it may be true that in histori-
cal evolution, we are not moving 
toward actual acts of superterror, it 
seems to me highly likely that the 
threat of possible superterror will 
be on the horizon soon, and what 
government will have to deal with is 
the question of a plausible target. I 
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wonder if you could comment on the 
relationship between a plausible 
threat of superterror and govern-
ment policy of hard line, no negotia-
tion, standing firm, and whether 
you see thresholds being crossed and 
the likely historical development in 
these directions. 
A (Stolfi): It would seem as if the 
government, if it is prudent and 
reasonable, would be in the process 
of planning, for example, for super-
terrorist incidents in some fashion. 
That would be something that is 
prudent and that simply has to be 
done. Even though the likelihood of 
something taking place is very 
remote, responsible people have to 
plan for it anyway. Some very cur-
ious and interesting things will 
emerge when the planning takes 
place. I think that people are going 
to find that superterrorist incidents 
are technically more difficult to 
carry out than one would think. 
There is also a strong possibility that 
they will be self-defeating. Let me 
give you just one quick example. A 
student of mine did a brilliant thesis 
over a 15-month period just recently 
on the liquid natural gas container 
ships, and he found that it is going to 
be very difficult to make a credible 
incident with a liquid natural gas 
container ship. I mean, you might 
have to spend 15 months, and I just 
had that research done for you. So 
there are going to be some problems 
with something like that, and there 
may be some other thresholds that 
will come out with that type of a 
superincident. 
